The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA, 1986) were adopted in 1986, as the most relevant legally binding instruments to establish a common framework of cooperation at international level on preparedness and response to nuclear and radiologi­cal emergencies. In parallel, some international and regional organizations, having responsibility for the use of nuclear energy, intensified their efforts for developing specific standards and recommendations to help their member states in improving and harmonizing national practices and regula­tions. Relevant examples of these initiatives are the publication of recom­mendations on interventions in the case of nuclear or radiological accidents by the ICRP; the regulation of trans-boundary movement of foodstuffs after a nuclear accident issued by the European Union (EU, 1987b) and the research projects on nuclear emergency promoted by the European Union Research Framework Programmes; the creation of the Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency; and the impulse given by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to the international standards and recommendations on nuclear emergency matters.

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident applies in the event of any accident involving nuclear facilities or activities of a state party, or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, in which a release of radioactive material has occurred that could be of radiological safety significance for another state. The state parties of this Convention are committed to forthwith notifying, directly or through the IAEA, those states which are or may be physically affected by a nuclear accident occur­ring in their territory. Every state party to this Convention is also committed to notifying the nature, the time and the exact location of the accident, as well as to providing, as soon as possible, available information to minimize the trans-boundary radiological consequences of the accident.

The state parties to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency are committed to cooperat­ing between them and with the IAEA, to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its con­sequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases. According to this Convention, to facilitate such cooperation, state parties may agree on bilateral or multilateral arrange­ments for preventing or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. The state parties can request the IAEA to use its best endeavours to promote, facilitate and support the cooperation between state parties.

Milestones 1-3

Conceptually, in a safeguards regime, the national objective of the SSAC is to account for and control all nuclear material in the State. The interna­tional objective of the SSAC is to provide the essential basis for the applica­tion of IAEA safeguards and to support relevant regional or bilateral safeguards (such as those relating to nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties). In practice, many SSACs aim to meet both the national and international objectives for nuclear material accounting and control, plus the interna­tional objective of complying with other safeguards obligations (e. g., AP if in force, relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty commitments, bilateral agreements with other States). In meeting these objectives, the main fea­tures of an SSAC would generally include at a minimum:

• The National Authority designated as the SSAC is independent of the facility operators.

• A framework is established (including legal and organizational ele­ments) that codifies the SSAC’s areas of responsibility, authority and regulation/control.

• Organizational and functional elements to support the safeguards regime are in place at the State level.

• Organizational and operational elements to support the safeguards regime are in place at the facility level as applicable.

From an operational point of view, the functions of an SSAC are carried out at two levels: the State level, implemented by the National Authority designated as the SSAC, and the facility level, which is implemented by facility operators. The State level is often responsible for the establishment of performance standards and implementation of safeguards requirements, and secondly, for confirming that the standards are maintained and the requirements met. An example of a performance standard is that the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material[65] is effective concerning:

1. Maintaining and processing records of all nuclear material (showing types, amounts, locations, transfers) and of responsible individuals

2. Evaluating and reviewing the operation of the system for loss mecha­nisms, shipper/receiver differences, Material Unaccounted For (MUF), and measurement uncertainties associated with MUF.

An example of a safeguards requirement, by contrast, is that the SSAC is able to:

1. Support and maintain records of IAEA activities in the State (inspec­tions and complementary access)

2. Handle the information required by regional or bilateral safeguards agreements with other States

3. Prepare reports and declarations for internal evaluation and for submis­sion to outside bodies (e. g., the IAEA, other States and the Government), including AP declarations required by Articles 2 and 3 (if the AP is in

force)[66]

4. Assemble the safeguards relevant information together, facilitate analy­sis, and record findings

5. Report to the Government.

To confirm that the standards are maintained and the requirements met, the SSAC may consider the conduct of an audit and verification programme with the following objectives:

1. Verifying the correctness and completeness of submitted accounting and operating records and evaluating data for abnormal trends

2. Examining the facility design information and available/proposed oper­ating practices presented in the nuclear facility licence/permit applica­tion to see if relevant safeguards objectives can be met

3. Ensuring the capability and performance of operators to account for and control nuclear material as required by both the State and the IAEA

4. Ensuring the accounting and control measures are adequate and effec­tive to conclude the absence of unauthorized removal or use of the nuclear material

5. Conducting inspections during construction, commissioning and start­up of a facility, to confirm that the approved nuclear material accounting and control arrangements have been implemented

6. Performing audits investigating the qualification and training of key personnel

7. Performing audits investigating the accuracy of nuclear material mea­surement systems

8. Verifying the correctness and completeness of submitted additional pro­tocol declarations (if applicable).

At the facility level, the operator is confronted with implementing the relevant safeguards requirements contained in the CSA and AP (if in force), in addition to its other requirements mandated by the State (e. g., safety, security, radiation protection in accordance with the facility operat­ing licence and other requisite permits/licences at the national, regional or local level). From a safeguards perspective, this involves meeting or exceed­ing the safeguards-relevant standards and performance requirements laid down by the SSAC. In this respect, some of the most important safeguards- related functions to be performed by an operator involve:

1. Maintaining a system of nuclear material accounting and control, and reporting of nuclear material accounting and operating records

2. Maintaining and reporting safeguards-relevant facility design informa­tion (including, in cases of planned facilities, the early provision of design information) and facility design changes

3. Preparing and reporting additional protocol-relevant information, if applicable

4. Responding to IAEA or SSAC requests for clarification or explanation

5. Provisioning IAEA access to appropriate locations for the conduct of inspections, design information verification visits, and where applicable, complementary access, or for purposes related to the application of IAEA containment and surveillance systems (e. g., installation, mainte­nance, servicing, removal)

6. Addressing questions or inconsistencies identified by the IAEA or SSAC

7. Resolving any open discrepancy or anomaly if applicable.

While capacity stagnation was the characteristic of nuclear power develop­ment in most world regions, this cannot be said about Asia (see Fig. 15.4). The surplus capacity situation did not exist really in the fast-growing industrialized countries with limited domestic energy resources (Japan or Republic of Korea) or in the even faster-growing populous developing countries of China and India. Here energy security remained a high priority policy item and, in the cases of China and India, fuelling their economic development aspirations called for the development of all supply options. Moreover, electricity market liberalization was less pronounced in these countries than in North America or Europe and government involvement in energy system investment decisions (and finance) continued.

Despite the fact that SEA has been a legal requirement since 2005, there has been relatively little commentary or practice that has emerged on what authorities are required to do with the output of the SEA process. As a result, this area is relatively untested in the context of major infrastructure development, and particularly in the area of nuclear/energy planning. The key question remains exactly how, if at all, local authorities should aim to integrate the results of the SEA process, and the conclusions of the Environmental Report, with the subsequent process of granting individual development consents for projects.

Even outside the energy sector there is surprisingly little written guidance on this and indeed very little written legal opinion on the appropriate use of SEA materials at the development consent stage (such challenges relat­ing to SEA that we have seen relating to the policies themselves, not the subsequent reliance upon them). This has the somewhat unfortunate result of potentially leaving authorities with the mistaken belief that the SEA process is an exercise with no real end. Nonetheless, this is not a safe assumption to make and does not sit at all comfortably with the express objective of the SEA Directive to ensure that environmental considerations are fully integrated in the development process. The way in which the SEA output material influences project-level development control decisions will be how, in practice, the process of SEA influences development on the ground with a view to promoting sustainable development.

In principle, the answer to this problem is relatively simple — when a developer makes a project-specific development consent application which relies upon, or perhaps more widely just bears upon, any ‘plan or pro­gramme’ which has been subject to the SEA regime, it will be important for the determining authority to at least make references to the Environmental Report, the output of the SEA regime which should have already been completed. The usual method by which this is effected is through the detailed project-level Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). There are undoubtedly some areas of overlap between the SEA process and the EIA process, but the Commission of the European Union has broadly distinguished the two on the basis that SEA applies ‘upstream’ to certain public plans and programmes, while EIA applies ‘downstream’ to certain public and private projects (European Commission, 2009, paragraph 3.5).

The IAEA requirements document divides external events into six major groups:

• Earthquakes and surface faulting

• Meteorological events

• Flooding

• Geotechnical hazards

• External human-induced events

• Other important considerations.

Earthquakes and surface faulting

The requirements clearly indicate that ‘the hazards associated with earth­quakes shall be determined by means of seismotectonic evaluation of the region with the use of the greatest possible extent of the information col­lected’, while the selected site requires an analysis of the fault capability existing there.

The earthquake and surface faulting requirements have been extended into several safety guides; there is a dedicated safety guide on seismic hazards on site evaluation (IAEA, 2010), where details on how a regional seismotectonic model and local surface faulting can be developed and how to quantify the seismic hazard by using deterministic and probabilistic approaches. These data serve to define the operating basis earthquake (OBE) and the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) which constitute the basis of the plant’s seismic design.

The URD presents a clear and comprehensive set of utility requirements for the next generation of nuclear power plants using LWRs in the USA. It was developed in the USA with the management and coordination of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and under the leadership of a group of American nuclear utilities. Some international utilities also took part in the development effort.

The URD consists of four volumes: [106]

• Volume II presents a complete set of both top-tier and detail require­ments for evolutionary-type advanced light water reactors (ALWRs).

• Volume III provides a comprehensive set of top-tier and detail require­ments for passive-type ALWRs.

The above Volumes II (Evolutionary ALWRs) and III (Passive ALWRs) each contain 13 chapters, as follows: (1) Overall requirements, defining common requirements applicable to a number of plant systems; (2) Power generation systems; (3) Reactor coolant system and reactor non-safety auxiliary systems; (4) Reactor systems; (5) Engineered safety systems; (6) Building design and arrangement; (7) Fuelling and refuelling; (8) Plant cooling water systems; (9) Site support systems; (10) Man-machine interface systems; (11) Electric power systems; (12) Radioactive waste processing systems; and (13) Turbine-generator systems.

The IAEA has produced a considerable body of work on quality assurance (QA) that has been widely adopted by Member States with NPP pro­grammes. Quality assurance in design, construction and operation is con­sidered in detail in Chapter 21. The IAEA approach to quality programmes for NPP processes has continued to evolve to be consistent with modern approaches (Persson, 2008). Initially, quality control was established to verify the conformance of systems at the completion of a process. Then, quality assurance was implemented to focus on prevention of non-confor­mance during production, thus becoming more performance-based as opposed to compliance-based. Next, a quality management approach was developed to encompass everyone involved in the processes. This included the concept of corporate safety culture and a focus on people.

The most recent manifestation of the IAEA quality programmes is an integrated management system where safety, health, environmental, secu­rity, quality and economic elements of an organization are all considered together (IAEA, 2006d). This approach was designed to address two general aims stated in INSAG-13, Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG, 1999):

To improve the safety performance of the organization through the planning, control and supervision of safety-related activities in normal, transient and emergency situations, and

To foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behaviour in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely.

Such a system is intended to produce a single coherent management system where all functions are integrated to achieve an organization’s objectives, and quality requirements are incorporated fully into all the daily work. The IAEA has published Safety Guides for implementing the system (IAEA, 2006e, 2009c).

A management system for construction is also covered by these Safety Guides, particularly in Appendix V of IAEA (2009c). This Guide stipulates that an organization should develop and implement a management system that includes the overall arrangements for the management, performance and assessment of the NPP during construction and that the organization should ensure the following:

• Construction work and work at the installation are carried out in accord­ance with design specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions, including the implementation of the relevant requirements.

• Construction work and work that is undertaken at the installation, including work by contractors, are coordinated, carried out and com­pleted in accordance with planned programmes.

• Access to the construction site is controlled.

• Interface arrangements exist among the construction organizations, sup­pliers and other organizational units performing the work.

During construction, QA includes all the actions necessary to provide confidence that a SSC will perform satisfactorily in service. This includes independent assessments of the effectiveness of all the processes related to design, procurement, and construction. The purpose of this is to ensure that the constructor delivers high-quality project work, taking into account both industrial and nuclear safety requirements. The QA plan verifies each of the processes using the hierarchy of prevention, detection, and correction. Suppliers of products and services also have to comply with the licensee’s QA requirements, which could cover all the important operational areas such as procurement, materials, manufacturing, handling and storage, and shipping.

The licensee must demonstrate to the RB that the QA requirements for the construction license are being met. The RB would normally review and inspect the licensee’s QA programme as well as the programmes for other involved organizations, such as suppliers of safety-related products and services, testing and calibration laboratories, nuclear steam system suppli­ers, and architect-engineering companies.

The licensee must also ensure that the constructor supplies all the docu­mentation needed to define the design basis for the plant in support of operations. This involves the implementation of a comprehensive document management system that enables all records, including QA records, equip­ment, materials, manuals, and drawings to be controlled and maintained.

Project engineering work requires a huge effort over a relatively short period of time. This can be done either by the utility itself or by its architect — engineer or main contractor or by a combination of efforts from some of the participants. In any case, the minimum involvement of the utility (review and approval) will amount to about 50,000 engineering man-hours.

The conceptual design task can involve from 20 to 30 experienced engi­neers and technicians for a period of up to 2-1 years. It is a task that should normally be completed about seven years before commercial operation of the plant. For the independent review, a total effort of at least 2000 man­hours would normally be required.

The next task of design engineering can be divided into two: basic and detailed design. Basic design engineering can involve 300,000 to 500,000 man-hours for a period of 6-12 months. The task of detailed design engi­neering involves about 2,500,000 man-hours of effort during a period of some 3-5 years. For specifications work there should be at least 10-12 engineers.

Adequate physical protection of the plant and nuclear material requires mainly administrative and security functions.

Procurement could also be handled directly by project management or by project engineering. A minimum number of professionals and techni­cians would be required for a centralized independent procurement unit.

The strategy to develop and implement a comprehensive training system should be established at an early stage (around eight years before the first fuel loading) of a new nuclear programme. This strategy will take as an input the necessity of human resources according to the staff planning (number of professionals and technicians needed to incorporate each year).

The first step in this strategy will be to analyse and identify the training needs; it will be very useful to organize different groups within the organiza­tion which will need a common initial training programme, for instance managers, engineers and instructors. These strategic groups will play an important role in the future nuclear project. These initial training pro­grammes are usually organized from the most generic (nuclear ‘indoctrina­tion’ courses) to the most specific according to the different training needs. The strategy to implement the training system will constitute an important section of the documentation usually submitted during the licensing process.

The training system, including the training organization and infrastruc­ture, must be fully completed and ready for implementation at least three years before the fuel loading in order to train the operation and mainte­nance plant staff. Meanwhile some initial training can be delivered using external expertise support if there is no national training organization avail­able. External support can be provided by the vendor (within the supply contract), international training organizations or training centres.

While NPPs are designed and operated with a very high level of safety, it is essential that an adequate level of preparedness is still maintained to deal with the highly unlikely situation of a reactor accident. Reactor accidents can be broadly categorized as design basis accidents (DBA) and beyond design basis accidents (BDBA). For a DBA the design provisions, including the engineered safety features such as the emergency core cooling system, and the reactor containment system, together with the actions taken by well-trained operators, should be able to contain or confine the radioactivity released from the reactor core such that there is no significant adverse impact beyond the NPP site. In the case of a BDBA that may be caused by unanticipated failure sequences or by multiple failures occurring simultane­ously or due to a natural phenomenon of intensity greater than that con­sidered in the design, there could be significant impact in the public domain. In modern NPP designs, due consideration is given to BDBAs also and provisions are made to enable the operator to control their progression and to minimize their adverse consequences.

The first step in emergency preparedness is to develop emergency operat­ing procedures for all envisaged situations and to impart intensive training to operators for their execution when required. Extensive use should be made of the training simulator for this purpose. It should, however, be kept in mind that it is not possible to anticipate all possible emergency situations. At times the operators will have to use their ingenuity and take actions that might not have been included in the emergency operating procedures. This is possible only when the operators have a thorough understanding of plant behaviour and a high level of technical competence.

Emergency plans need to be in place for actions that are to be taken in case a reactor accident has a potential for or causes actual release of radio­activity outside the reactor containment. The actions could be in the form of countermeasures such as administration of prophylactics to prevent uptake of radioactive iodine by people, impounding food and milk, barri­cading of radioactively contaminated areas or even evacuation of affected or likely to be affected populations. For deciding on the type of emergency actions, their extent and the zone around the NPP where these need to be implemented, an assessment of the quantum of activity released has to be made. Further, the dispersal of the activity in the atmosphere and its deposi­tion on the ground taking into account the prevailing weather conditions has to be estimated For the longer term the radiation dose to the public by the terrestrial and aquatic routes and through the food chain has to be computed. These assessments have to be made through analysis of a large number of air, water, soil and food samples for their radioactivity content and by using computational models for estimating the dose to the members of the public by direct exposure as also through the inhalation and ingestion routes.

Emergency preparedness involves developing the requisite technical competence for carrying out such assessments in quick time, deciding on the countermeasures to be implemented and finally executing the actions in an organized manner. As implementation of countermeasures will be done by the public authorities, it is essential to have a mechanism in place for proper and timely coordination between the NPP and the public author­ities. Emergency exercises have to be carried out regularly according to the time schedule approved by the regulatory body to test the plans to be in a good state of preparedness to manage emergencies.