The HLW from reprocessing has a high radiation level and generates heat. It will thus require special care for storage and handling. The HLW canisters are stored at the reprocessing plants in large vaults. Normally the HLW canisters are stacked on top of each other (about 10) in tubes that are cooled by air from the outside. Transport of the HLW is carried out with transport containers similar to those used for spent fuel. These containers can also be used for storage of the waste.

The ILW and LLW from reprocessing has a very low heat generation and can be stored and transported in a similar way to ILW and LLW from nuclear power plants (see Section 14.5.3).

At a national level, the main benefits of nuclear power are security of supply, steady costs of base-load electricity and a contribution to a low- carbon electric mix. It is difficult (and slightly artificial) to distinguish the social and economic impacts of nuclear power for a country. Access to electricity at a steady and low cost is an economic benefit, which results from the production costs of nuclear electricity, but there is also a social impact in access to electricity, particularly in developing countries, as it conditions development, health, access to knowledge, and so on. Building a nuclear plant is cost intensive but, in operation, the fuel cost represents less than 10% of production costs so that, even if the price of uranium increases, it will not have significant impact on the kWh production cost. According to a 2000 study in Finland, cited in WNA’s The Economics of Nuclear Power (WNA, 2010), a doubling of fuel prices would result in the electricity costs from nuclear energy rising by about 9%, for coal by 31% and for gas by 66% (see also Chapter 15 on economics). For a newcomer country, in an opportunity study, it will be necessary to draw up forecasts of the country’s energy demand (for instance, with high and low scenarios, taking into account growth of GDP), and to compare the competitiveness of the different electricity production options — whether coal, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine, or (possibly in oil countries) an oil-fired plant. In coun­tries which produce high-value fossil sources (oil or gas), the revenues ‘saved’ by nuclear production and generated by exporting oil or gas also have to be taken into account. However, in the case of nuclear kWh produc­tion, all life-cycle environmental costs need to be internalized, notably including those associated with waste management and decommissioning (though if CO2 emissions were priced, it would increase nuclear competi­tiveness against fossil fuel sources).

Several international studies have been undertaken to quantify the exter­nal costs of nuclear power, i. e. to look at ‘externalities’, or those effects that are not included in the economic production costs of nuclear power. These externalities may be negative or positive. At a national level, nuclear elec­tricity (like other new renewable sources in national policies against climate change) should be recognized as a low-carbon option, and the tons of CO2 saved should be considered as positive externalities and evaluated for that. In its study Nuclear Energy and Addressing Climate Change (NEA, 2009), the NEA suggests that, in terms of CO2 emissions/kWh produced in the most modern plants, among the different sources of electricity production, nuclear power emits about 8 g CO2/kWh, as opposed to 400 g. eq. CO2/kWh for Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) and 1000 g. eq. CO2/kWh for coal. In this respect, nuclear power, with hydraulics, is an essential tool to reduce base-load electricity CO2 emissions. The new renewable energies have the same low-carbon characteristics but they cannot be used in base-load production.

Another social or political impact on a national scale which should be considered is the risk of proliferation, even if this is less a risk for a country itself than it is for all other countries (see Chapter 13).

The contaminated land regime, introduced by Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 1990; see also the Contaminated Land Regulations 2006), was extended (with modification) to cover radioactive contaminated land by the Radioactive Contaminated Land (Enabling Powers) Regulations 2005 and the Radioactive Contaminated Land (Modification of Enactments) Regulations 2006 and 2007. In combination, they provide a regulatory system for identifying and requiring the remediation of contaminated land adjacent to nuclear sites where such land is causing lasting radiation expo­sure to any person, or where there is a significant possibility of such expo­sure. Extending the regime to cover radioactivity was necessary to ensure that the UK complied with its obligations to transpose Articles 48 and 53 of the Basic Safety Standards Directive (Directive 96/29 Euratom). The identification of contaminated land is based upon establishing a pollution linkage from a contaminant, through a pathway to a receptor. In the case of radioactive contaminated land, the receptor vulnerable to harm must be a human. The regime is based on the ‘polluter pays’ principle, unless the polluter cannot be found, in which case liability for remediation will shift to the owner or occupier of land (Section 78F of the EPA 1990). Determining responsibility may become an important issue where historic nuclear sites are being used for the commissioning of new plant.

Although the primary regulatory responsibility for contaminated land under Part 2A rests with local authorities, the EA is the enforcing authority where land is characterised as a ‘special site’ by virtue of radioactivity. A risk-based approach to remediation will be applied having regard to the anticipated costs and the seriousness of the risks or harm, and the enforcing authority is obliged to consider the contaminated land regime guidance document issued by the Secretary of State. The potential costs of contami­nated land remediation could be extremely high, and a failure to comply with the terms of a remediation notice may result in the imposition of a fine, including the possibility of a daily fine for continued non-compliance (Section 78M). The enforcing authorities are also empowered to carry out the remediation themselves (Section 78BN) and to recover their reasonable costs from the party deemed responsible (Section 78P).

19.7.1 Purpose

As its name indicates, the purpose of the scope of supply (SS) document is to define the scope of supply and services of the various participants in the delivery of the nuclear plant (i. e. vendors, the owner and other participants, as the case may be). The document should clearly describe the scope of each, the division of responsibilities (DOR), the respective limits of supply (terminal points) and the interfaces among project participants.

19.7.2 Contents

The power plant purchasing contract model selected by the owner largely influences the contents of the SS document; however, the structure of the document (i. e. its table of contents) basically remains the same, regardless of the contracting approach, and would organise the information as follows:

• Introduction

• Owner’s scope of supply

• Bidder’s scope of supply

• Other participants’ scope of supply

• Definition of interfaces among project participants

• Division of responsibilities (DOR) tables

• Options.

Regardless of the contract approach selected (i. e. turnkey, split-package, multi-package), the SS document shall clearly specify the scope of supply and services that the owner assigns to himself, to the bidder and to the rest of project participants. To this end, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Account System (IAEA, 2000) constitutes a good guideline. It consists of a list of all major items that make up the entire power plant scope of supply. It can be used as a reference to ensure that each scope item is assigned to one of the project participants. It can also assist in verifying the completeness of the scope of supply and ensuring that none of the scope items remains unassigned. There are other systems of account that can be used for the same purpose.

The design selected must undergo a formal design safety review process by the regulator before a construction license can be issued. This review deter­mines whether the design of the selected technology meets the required national safety regulations. Normally, these regulations will be consistent with the IAEA Safety Standards, which constitute the international con­sensus on nuclear safety in the form of Principles, Requirements, and Guides. A recent overview of the current status of the relevant IAEA docu­mentation is available from the IAEA (IAEA, 2010a). Chapter 9 discusses current and near-future available technologies.

The IAEA has published a Safety Requirements document to establish the generally applicable requirements for a safety assessment of nuclear facilities and activities (IAEA, 2009a). The major licensing document the licensee must provide for a construction license is the PSAR for the selected NPP design. This is a comprehensive document running to thousands of pages of technical information, backed up by detailed analyses, R&D results, and other supporting documentation. Table 20.3 lists the content and some examples of the scope of material that needs to be covered (IAEA, 2004b). It is clear from Table 20.3 that the licensee must be familiar with all aspects of the NPP life cycle: design, construction, commissioning, operations, and decommissioning. The PSAR is the licensee’s evaluation of the safety basis for the plant covering its entire plant life cycle.

The production of the PSAR is a major task. Normally, the vendor/ designer provides much of the non-site specific technical information for this document. The licensee must provide the information that is specific to the country building the NPP, such as site conditions and operating

668 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

Table 20.3 Safety analysis report content

organization information. Notwithstanding the contributions from the vendor/designer, the licensee must have access to expertise for each of the PSAR areas. It is not possible to operate an NPP safely without this knowl­edge, whether available internally or obtained externally through technical support organizations. The latter would include access to R&D facilities capable of handling and characterizing radioactive components.

The regulator performs a detailed independent assessment of the PSAR and usually presents its results in a safety evaluation report (SER). The SER then becomes the technical basis for awarding or denying the con­struction license and for establishing the required limits and conditions to be complied by the licensee. Therefore, the licensee must be prepared to respond effectively during the evaluation process to any detailed technical questions from the regulator on the PSAR topics using internal or external expertise.

Safe operation of nuclear power installations depends on the maintenance of effective control, cooling and containment of the reactor core and its contents at all times. Designers provided systems and safeguards to satisfy these requirements. It is the role of the operator to ensure that these systems and safeguards remain available and functional through all phases of start-up, steady-state operation, transients, shutdowns and maintenance activities. The operator is also required to ensure that the plant operates within design limits and conditions that are determined in the design phase safety analysis.

Suitably qualified and experienced personnel are charged with these responsibilities; the numbers and qualifications of such people so charged are also part of the safety analysis and feature as limits and conditions to be observed in regulations.

Engineered safeguards are designed to maintain core control, cooling and containment of the reactor core. To ensure the availability and functionality of equipment, the operators conduct surveillance tests, preventative main­tenance activities, inventory management and configuration management activities. These requirements feature in the form of rules and regulations for operator compliance.

From time to time, equipment will become unavailable or inoperable, operational limits will be encroached upon and transients will occur. In such

circumstances it is important that the operator makes decisions in a control­led and logical manner that are consistent with the plant design limits and conditions. Technical specifications provide the operator with the basis for such decision-making.

The IAEA Safety Guide on limits and conditions (IAEA, 2000) describes the basis for the development of operating limits and conditions or techni­cal specifications.

The US, Nuclear Regulatory Commission were the pioneers in the devel­opment and use of technical specifications. In the US, Standard Technical Specifications (STS) are published for each of the five reactor types as a NUREG-series publication. Plants are required to operate within those specifications. The regulations describe the limits and conditions to be observed in a whole range of reactor parameters.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the nuclear generational change started, many international organizations declared their concerns regarding the lack of enough candidates to substitute for the retiring workforce, due to declining interest among students in nuclear matters. This situation would threaten the preservation of nuclear knowledge in the world.

In the report Nuclear education and training: Cause for concern? (NEA, 2000) the Nuclear Energy Agency alerted the national authorities respon­sible for education and nuclear safety and encouraged them to take urgent actions on the following recommendations:

• The strategic role of governments

• The challenges of revitalizing nuclear education by universities

• Vigorous research and maintaining high-quality training

• The benefits of collaboration and sharing best practices.

Adequate attention to industrial safety, including fire safety and housekeep­ing, is a must during the construction of an NPP. Any deficiency in these areas will not only be detrimental to the health and safety of the construc­tion workers but will also dilute the safety culture at the site, which will have an adverse impact on the commissioning and O&M activities subse­quently. Responsibility for industrial safety should be with utility personnel even though actual construction work is done by contractors. All jobs must be subjected to hazard analysis and appropriate procedures and personnel protective equipment requirements laid down for their execution. As the status of work keeps changing rapidly at a construction site, the supervisors responsible for industrial safety must make frequent visits to the site for an on-the-spot assessment and enforcement of safety requirements, including their augmentation where necessary.

Emergency planning lies within the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles. Technically it is also considered as the last level of protection against acci­dents with external radiological consequences. Principle 9 requires that ‘Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation incidents’. Emergency planning is a responsibility of government; arrangements should secure adequate response at the local, regional, national and even international levels, when required.

The line of responsibility for taking urgent decisions needs to be defined well in advance. In nuclear power plants, emergencies generally start within the plant and, as demonstrated in Fukushima, nuclear emergencies can be started by natural or manmade emergencies. During an onsite phase, the licensee is responsible for actions taken under the supervision of the regula­tory authority, following well-known and rehearsed procedures. An alert situation should be declared quickly when there is no evidence that the plant can be brought under control. At that moment, an offsite emergency plan is initiated and conducted under the responsibility and authority of local, regional and state authorities, as the case may be, with the advice of the regulatory authority and with help and information provided by the licensee.

Public protection actions may include shelter, evacuation, decontamina­tion, medical treatment (when necessary) and prophylaxis activities, such as ingesting potassium iodide to block radioactive iodine from entering into the body. Arrangements should include well-trained human resources, emergency procedures and reliable equipment, suitable installations and services for evacuees. National and international information, as well as humanitarian help to the people affected, are required.

Any inconvenience that people may suffer from emergency protection activities has the advantage of avoiding or reducing radiation exposure. These inconveniences are related to the conduct of periodic drills which often involve the nearby population. In case of real emergencies, remaining under shelter and being evacuated or displaced for long periods of time (as in the cases of Chernobyl-4 and Fukushima-1) are problems that affected people have to suffer. Decontamination of affected buildings to allow the return of evacuees and the restoration of agricultural soils can take a long time and create inconveniences to people’s lives. These remote circum­stances should be compared with the benefits that the neighbouring popula­tion will receive with certainty.

The main industries interested in the use of process heat are the petroleum and coal processing, chemical, paper, primary metal and food processing industries. The application of nuclear heat for industrial process applica­tions has significant potential that has not yet been realized to a large extent. Currently, only the Goesgen reactor in Switzerland and the RAPS-2 reactor in India continue to provide heat for industrial processes, whereas other nuclear heat systems used for industrial processes have been discon­tinued even after successful use. Among the reasons cited for the closure of these units, one is availability of cheaper alternate energy sources, includ­ing waste heat near the industrial complexes. Previous experiences with nuclear energy in providing process heat for industrial purposes exist in Canada, Germany, Norway and Switzerland. In Canada, several CANDU reactors supplied steam for industries such as food processing and industrial alcohol production until 1998. In Germany, the Stade PWR has supplied steam for a salt refinery located 1.5 km from the plant during the period December 1983 to November 2003. In Norway, the Halden Reactor has supplied steam to a nearby factory for many years. In Switzerland, the Goesgen PWR has been delivering process steam to a cardboard factory located 2 km from the plant since 1979.